Op Sindoor: India’s Defence by Denial Mechanism Remains Relevant

Brief By Debalina Ghoshal Download Brief Here

India’s Operation Sindoor became a success story not only because of India’s ability to launch offensives against asymmetric targets as well as against crucial counter-force and counter-value targets, but also because of its defensive capabilities to bear the repercussions from the adversary’s side in response to such attacks. This dual capability highlights the strategic balance that India has sought to maintain, wherein it effectively deters threats while also being prepared for potential retaliation. In this context, the paper aims to study and understand India’s air and missile defence capabilities from a theoretical perspective to strengthen our conceptual understanding, exploring not only historical successes and challenges but also the evolving nature of warfare in the contemporary landscape. By analysing these aspects, the research will provide insights into how India can further enhance its security apparatus in light of emerging technologies and geopolitical dynamics.

Conceptual Understanding of ‘Defence by Denial’ Mechanism

Newton’s third law of motion suggests that ‘to every action, there will be an equal and opposite reaction.’ While this theory proved true as Pakistan launched heavy offensives against India’s response to destroying terrorist hideouts post Pahalgam attack in 2025, such a theory remained confined to the ‘opposite’ response from Pakistan’s side, rather than an ‘equal and opposite’ response.’ This discrepancy arises because most of its capabilities that could inflict an ‘equal response’ were effectively thwarted by India’s advanced air and missile defence capabilities, showcasing the complexity and strategic nuances of modern warfare. In evaluating the effectiveness of any deterrence or combat strategy, there is a fundamental need for an offence-defence balance. This balance in offensive-defensive capability not only strengthens deterrence but also ensures that, if deterrence fails and the spectre of war looms large, the established offence-defence balance can facilitate a state in achieving decisive results during periods of crisis or in war-like situations. In other words, air and missile defence capabilities serve as a ‘deterrence by denial’ mechanism that aims to prevent adversaries from attempting to breach a state’s defensive perimeter.

Military might is not solely reliant on its offensive capabilities, but is equally contingent upon the robustness of its defensive capabilities

However, when such mechanisms fail to effectively deter adversaries from launching offensive operations, it becomes imperative that the same denial mechanism maintains its credibility to reinforce the state’s ‘defence by denial’. India’s Operation Sindoor, executed in May 2025, which was a direct response to Pakistan’s terrorist attack on innocent tourists in Pahalgam, proved convincingly that a state’s military might is not solely reliant on its offensive capabilities, but is equally contingent upon the robustness of its defensive capabilities. Pakistan’s strategic efforts to neutralise India’s offensive advantage were thwarted by India’s sophisticated ability to counteract and neutralise Pakistan’s counter-force offensives.

In the Operation Sindoor, India successfully witnessed the deployment as well as the employment of its ‘defence by denial’ missile capabilities to protect its assets, while simultaneously deterring adversaries’ offensives through a series of concerted actions. It is crucial to understand that there exists a distinct difference between the deployment and employment of weapon systems. Deployment indicates that the weapon system is operationally capable and ready to be launched during times of crisis, demonstrating a preparedness that is vital in modern military engagements. On the other hand, employment means that the weapon systems have been able to achieve their targeting missions successfully and deliver the intended impact. For instance, Pakistan’s missiles used to target India’s airfields were deployed successfully as they were launched with the intent of striking Indian military bases, yet their rate of success in employment was ultimately nullified by India’s formidable air defence capabilities, underscoring the critical interplay between offence and defence in contemporary conflict scenarios.

The Operation Sindoor successfully witnessed India’s transition phase from induction to deployment to employment of its weapon systems

In the recent India-Pakistan crisis, India’s air and missile defence systems proved that they were not only deployable for strengthening deterrence but also employable for combat purposes. When weapons are employable, a state’s security and defence are strengthened even when deterrence fails, as seen in the recent event. India’s defence posturing follows a strategy of ‘induction’ of weapon systems that restricts the deployment of weapon systems. This helps India to draw a distinction between peacetime exercises and crisis situations. The Operation Sindoor successfully witnessed India’s transition phase from induction to deployment to employment of its weapon systems.

Generally, deterrence enhances the protection of civilians, as deterrence posturing is aimed at signalling to adversaries the capabilities that a state possesses to dissuade the adversary from launching any attack. But the recent India-Pakistan scenario revealed a reverse dissuasion mechanism. The ability of the air and missile defence capability of India to protect its civilians and strategic assets by defeating Pakistani missile and drone systems, in addition to its own offensive strategic assets, including air bases being neutralised by India’s offensive capabilities, deterring Pakistan from launching any further offensives against India.

Pakistan’s missile attack on New Delhi highlighted Rawalpindi’s security paradigm not only revolving around developing targeting capabilities against India’s counter-force capabilities, but also against India’s counter-value capabilities. When weapon systems are capable of keeping civilian infrastructure at risk, they become ‘weapons of terror.’ However, India’s credible air and missile defence capabilities nullified Pakistan’s credibility of its offensive systems becoming ‘weapons of terror.’ Credibility of a weapon system relies not only on the development of the weapon system but also on the ability of the weapon system to function effectively in a contested environment. This contested environment becomes more complex when adversaries possess sophisticated defensive capabilities that significantly complicate the state’s ability to launch offensives successfully. Such mechanisms not only adversely affect the state’s weaponry capabilities but also diminish their ability to become ‘weapons for deterrence’ or ‘weapons of terror.’ The combat value of such missiles used by adversaries is greatly reduced as their military utility is lowered, thereby influencing strategic outcomes on the battlefield. In this landscape of modern warfare, Rawalpindi had not only employed its missile capabilities as ‘weapons of terror’ against the capital city but also strategically used them as tools for achieving decisive results in combat scenarios.

The targeted use of missile systems to strike India’s airbases aimed at negating India’s air power combat capability for both offensive and defensive roles highlights a calculated military approach. Additionally, this strategy also sought to neutralise India’s delivery platforms to launch deep strike missions, indicating that Pakistan’s targeting strategies included not only counter-force but also counter-value targets, ensuring a psychological defeat for India. Furthermore, such tactics served the dual purpose of instilling fear while attempting to undermine public confidence in national security. However, it is noteworthy that these missiles were intercepted successfully by Indian air and missile defence systems, which stands as a testament to the effectiveness of India’s defensive measures.

When weapon systems are capable of keeping
civilian infrastructure at risk, they become ‘weapons of terror’

India’s S-400s, Akash, Pechora, SAMAR, and Barak-8 air and missile defence systems have provided a robust ‘defense by denial’ mechanism that neutralized Pakistan’s offensive capabilities, including missiles and drones, as well as advanced fighter jets and Airborne Early Warning Control Systems that had breached the Line of Control (LoC) to jeopardize peace and stability in the region. The Pechora systems, in particular, still proved integral to India’s ‘defence by denial’ capability despite the enhancements made with the addition of modern air and missile systems into the arsenal. (1) Such multi-layered defence strategies not only preserve national integrity but also serve as a significant deterrent against future aggressions, reinforcing the notion that technological advancement in defence is vital in contemporary warfare dynamics.

These defence systems are crucial components of India’s layered defence architecture, designed to comprehensively address diverse threats from intruders. As emphasised by the present Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), Lt. Gen. Rajiv Ghai, “at least one layer will strike intruders.” This statement underscores the proactive nature of the layered defence system, which effectively closes the gap associated with the limitations of individual weapon systems to ensure a robust ‘defence by denial’ capability. The essence of this capability lies in the principle that if one weapon system fails to engage an incoming threat, another weapon within the layered system is positioned to effectively track and intercept the adversary’s offensive capabilities. It must be noted that a weapon system can only be employed successfully when all its sub-systems operate seamlessly and efficiently together.

Multi-layered defence strategies not only preserve national integrity but also serve as a significant deterrent against future aggression

Moreover, the integration of robust radar systems that are networked effectively, alongside advanced jammers and various electronic warfare mechanisms, provides a significantly enhanced scope for the air and missile defence systems, allowing them to neutralise targets more successfully and efficiently in the face of evolving threats. This strategic approach not only bolsters immediate defensive measures but also instils a greater sense of security among the populace, reflecting India’s commitment to maintaining its sovereignty and protecting its interests in a complex regional security environment. As Advanced technologies are adopted in network-centric warfare, like the Software-Defined Radio (SDR), which are integrated with air and missile defence systems that enabled these systems to function successfully. (2) Indigenous data link systems forming part of Tactical Data Links (TDLs) similar to NATO Link-16 proved their mettle during Operation Sindoor, especially as they were integrated with the SDRs.

In addition, every defence system needs a robust command and control network, which is essential for effective coordination and rapid responses in critical situations. In the context of Operation Sindoor, the air and missile defence system demonstrated impressive capabilities and proved their mettle, thanks in large part to the Integrated Air Command and Control Systems (IACC). (3) This advanced network facilitated seamless communication and real-time data sharing among various components, allowing for a comprehensive view of the battle space. As a result, the functioning of the multi-layered air and missile defence capabilities became a resounding success, enabling forces to intercept threats efficiently and protect vital assets against potential aerial attacks. The integration of cutting-edge technology and strategic planning played a crucial role in enhancing overall operational effectiveness.

Modern warfare is not only about possessing advanced network-centric capabilities, but their integration is also crucial for successful military operations. This integration further becomes complex when the three services’ network-centric capabilities require integration in a way that could make the layered defence mechanism a success. Not only was the IACC the reason for India successfully tracking and intercepting adversaries’ drones, missiles, fighter-jets and Airborne Early Warning Control Systems but IAF IACC’s integration with the Indian Army’s Air Defence Network, Akashteer and Indian Navy’s Trigun enabled India to achieve success in thwarting Pakistan’s ability to launch decisive offensives. (4)

As put forward by a daily, “[t]he IACCS system receives data from different types of homogeneous/ heterogeneous radars (2-D or 3-D), generate reports from mobile observation posts, and integrate other data elements from various other Air Force Airbases or Civilian agencies, viz Air Traffic Control, Air Force Movement Liaison Unit, including airborne AWACS, etc., to create a real-time comprehensive Recognised Air Situation Picture (RASP) at IACCS Command & Control Centre (C & C Centre).” (5)

IACC integration with the Indian Army’s Air Defence Network, Akashteer and Indian Navy’s Trigun enabled India to achieve success in thwarting Pakistan’s ability to launch decisive offensives

In addition, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO)’s role in Operation Sindoor to provide Indian armed forces with precise trajectory tracking during air and missile defence operations is noteworthy to intercept and neutralise incoming drones and missiles. (6) This sharing of crucial information of the precise trajectory of incoming missiles and drones proved fruitful for the Indian armed forces’ air and missile defence operations. This ability to neutralise the target successfully strengthened India’s conventional deterrence posture while it weakened Pakistan’s conventional deterrence posture. Maybe, to an extent, it weakened Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent posture as Pakistan’s nuclear delivery systems probably could have faced serious contested environments to deliver nuclear warheads into Indian territory to inflict damage. Of course, as the Indian Air Force’s Air Marshal A.K. Bharti, Director General Air Operations (DGAO) has acknowledged that technological advancements could only happen when the government provides budgetary help and charts out policies that would complement India’s defence doctrines. (7) There is little denying the fact that the Indian government has paid utmost heed to the defence and security needs of the country.

ISRO role in Operation Sindoor to provide Indian armed forces with precise trajectory tracking during air and missile defence operations is noteworthy

The decision to acquire the S-400 air and missile defence capability happened amid sanctions imposed by the United States on Russia. However, India refused to accept any unilateral sanctions imposed against any country and remained firm on its decision to abide by the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (8) Such capabilities have increased the cost and resources required to launch catastrophic attacks on India. Such capabilities, along with India’s offensive capabilities that wreak havoc in Pakistan’s territory and have put across one message clearly- proxy wars are no longer an inexpensive means of warfare for Pakistan.

Offensive weapons to destroy Pakistan’s airbases, air defence systems, and other strategic assets proved Pakistan would have to bear severe losses as a response to terrorist attacks launched by Rawalpindi. India’s air and missile defence capabilities have signalled to Pakistan that the choice of retaliation will be a costly affair for Pakistan. Again, India’s air and missile defence capability has silenced those critics who raised concerns that such capabilities could be used by India to launch a ‘first strike’ on adversaries with its offensive capabilities and use the defence systems to thwart adversaries’ ability to launch a nuclear attack. Operation Sindoor explained India’s need for air and missile defence systems to protect its counter-force and counter-value targets including its population during conventional conflicts. It highlighted the imperative nature of ensuring national security in a region rife with tensions and the unpredictable dynamics of warfare. A perfect amalgamation of both exported defensive systems and home-grown capabilities provided greater flexibility in its operations during times of crises, allowing for a multifaceted approach to defence that encompasses both strategic deterrence and tactical response. For example, the Electronic Counter Counter Measures (ECCM) on Akash Short Range Surface to Air Missile (SAM) that is ‘Made in India’ complemented India’s S-400s that were exported from Russia. The integration of advanced technologies and rigorous training of personnel in these systems has further bolstered India’s readiness, making it clear that India is not only prepared to defend itself but also to engage effectively should the need arise.

Operation Sindoor explained
India’s need for air and missile defence systems

India’s Defence by Denial and “No-first Use” Doctrine

Many critiques of air defence, BMD and Cruise Missile Defence (CMD) systems claim that such technologies could adversely affect the nuclear doctrines of countries. States may resort to a ‘first-use’ or ‘first strike’ option in case they are assured of a possessing a ‘defence by denial’ capability that could successfully intercept the enemy’s retaliatory capabilities when they are launched against the state. However, India’s ‘no-first use’ doctrine is strengthened with its ‘defence by denial’ capabilities that allow New Delhi to launch conventional offensives against its adversaries in times of crisis, keeping the nuclear threshold high. India’s nuclear strategy is based on ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ and this credibility is assured not only with the help of offensive nuclear capabilities but also through denial capabilities that enable the survivability of such nuclear capabilities. This means that because India knows its nuclear forces and arsenals are survivable, the dilemma of ‘use them or lose them’ did not dominate the mindset during the crisis in Operation Sindoor.

India’s ‘no-first use’ doctrine is strengthened with its ‘defence by denial’ capabilities that allow New Delhi to launch conventional offensives against its adversaries in times of crisis

Also, ‘defence by denial’ strengthened India’s conventional deterrence posturing by allowing its conventional capabilities to gain decisive advantages without the need to implement the use of nuclear weapons. Despite Pakistan using its drones, missiles and airpower to neutralise India’s conventional advantage vis-à-vis Pakistan, New Delhi’s composed attitude was determined by its ability to defend its counter-strike and counter-value targets against Pakistan’s conventional strikes and also the confidence in its ability to strike Pakistan’s critical assets.

Operation Sindoor became an eye-opener for the global order regarding India’s need for air and missile defence capabilities to strengthen its ‘no-first use’ doctrine by strengthening the survivability options of its conventional and nuclear forces. Its ‘defence by denial’ capabilities enabled New Delhi to initially respond in asymmetric mode, that is, launching strikes against Pakistani terrorist hideouts. Nevertheless, in response to Pakistan’s strikes on India’s counter-force targets and counter-value targets that were successfully neutralised, India also indulged in conventional offensives.

Operation Sindoor became an eye-opener for the global order regarding India’s need for air and missile defence capabilities to strengthen its ‘no-first use’ doctrine

Long Way Ahead

It must be noted that the success of Operation Sindoor was completely based on the successful integrated networking of key assets. As Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan puts it, “Artificial Intelligence (AI) must be integrated into military operations, intelligence, and war-gaming rather than data reliant and reactive.” (9) Integration and automation will remain critical to the success of network-centric operations, which is also a crucial element in the successful functioning of air and missile defence capabilities. Future crisis scenarios will require calibrated and precision response from tri services, which would include not only offensive responses but also, as learnt from Operation Sindoor, defensive responses too. This would be possible with the help of real-time identification of threat, assessment and interception of the threat across multiple domains as identified by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The assessment of the threats in a successful manner would help the tri services to identify whether the threat emanating has a destructive effect or is a dummy.

The success of Operation Sindoor
was completely based on the successful integrated networking of key assets

The more strengthened shall be the joint planning mechanisms between the tri services, the stronger will be the systems’ integration and networking, including the command and control. Decentralised decision-making for local commanders in times of crisis would require greater alertness regarding the identification of real-time threats, friends and foes. Also, the real-time information must not just be processed in the initial layer of the command chain but must pass through the lowest level of the command chain in the quickest time possible so as to be able to respond in a timely manner and only against threats that would cause a catastrophic impact.

There must also be a greater focus on cyber survivability of network-centric operations in air and missile defence systems. A network-centric system being hacked by adversaries during critical military operations would prove fatal for India’s national security. Modern advanced systems like AI in network-centric Operations will introduce new challenges of cybersecurity, exposing the vulnerability of the defensive systems against enemy attacks. These cybersecurity challenges could vary from hacking into critical design information of air and missile defence systems in order to develop counter-measures against them, and also to jeopardise their successful functioning by destabilising the technological functionality.

Greater focus should be provided in protecting the Observing, Orienting, Deciding and Acting (OODA) loop in the air and missile defence architecture to be able to engage successfully threats of all kinds. Speed and range of interceptors must be able to cope with the speed and range of offensive capabilities, especially hypersonic weapons and weapons with deep strike capabilities and stand-off ranges. India’s success in defensive mechanisms proves that India’s choices of maintaining its offence-defence balance have proved its worth as such capabilities were capable of thwarting Pakistan’s plans of launching any decisive offensives. Thus, while Pakistan’s missile and drone capabilities were capable of launching offensives, they were not capable of achieving any decisive result. Their response was a proportionate response to India’s offensives, but the response could not achieve equality in inflicting damage on India’s strategic assets, including its air power capability. Military response could only be considered to be equal from the adversary’s side when their weapons capabilities have proved their military utility during operations. [End]

There must also be a greater focus on cyber survivability of network-centric operations in air and missile defence systems