Article by Debalina Ghoshal
Foreign policy is not a static process in the given multi-polar world order. India’s foreign policy challenges will continue to intensify because it does not maintain alliance-based relations with friendly countries and instead pursues partnerships. This non-alignment ideology has been the backbone of India’s foreign policy, irrespective of the governing order. India has balanced its policies by overcoming challenges in every era rather than finding easy processes in foreign policy practice.
The recent Iran-Israel War has repercussions in India, too. Traditional security challenges often affect non-traditional security. The recent Iran-Israel War has brought India’s non-traditional security into crisis, exposing the Indian governance order and its foreign policy choices to criticism. But this article highlights India’s vulnerabilities during crises that emanate not because of its weaknesses but its robust policies dating back to 1991. It also argues that foreign policy is a static process when other states are also practising policies that are symbiotic for India’s growth. In the absence of such a circumstance, foreign policy would depend on how each state has or is treating India.
Perfections and Vulnerabilities
Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation (LPG) in 1991 was a gift P.V. Narasimha Rao, the then prime minister of India, bestowed on the country. The then finance minister, Dr Manmohan Singh’s vision to ensure that an open economy strengthens the backbone of non-traditional security. But such policies are vulnerable owing to elasticity in the geo-strategic environment in an LPG-driven economy. This vulnerability is worsening in the present security environment with geopolitical and geo-strategic choices of other states.
Owing to the fact that such a model of economy cannot be altered, as it is the best form of economy that is supporting India’s growth story, the repercussions of global fallout will bear adverse impacts on India’s economy. Such vulnerabilities were visible during the United States subprime mortgage crisis and recession in 2008-2009, and even with the best policy makers, the economy bore the adverse impacts.
Nevertheless, despite its limitations, LPG remains the only choice for India owing to India’s own limitations in certain fields and also owing to its potential in others that mandate an export-import driven economy. With the change in governance in 2014, none of the finance ministers had meddled with this LPG model, as it continued to be the best model for achieving economic growth. But as identified, such models may have detrimental ramifications when an international or regional crisis occurs. An LPG model requires perfect foreign policy practices that render results visible through economic growth.
India has developed strengthened trade relations with almost all regions of the world. However, it must be noted that the foreign policy of a state is not solely the choices it makes according to its geo-strategic, geo-political and geo-economic requirements. It is also a result of similar choices and decisions made by other states in the region. These choices are determined by many factors that include the need for achieving regional hegemony through military assertiveness, economic growth and stability.
Iran is a friend of India, and in 2015, during the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), India supported the deal and always respected Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
But Iran’s top leadership has also spoken about its interest in joining the Saudi-Pakistan defence pact in 2025. Despite Shia killings in Pakistan, Iran’s inclination towards Pakistan was its own strategic choice. Iran had also probably not realised that the pact also had conditions similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), an attack on one would be construed as an attack on the other countries of the pact as well. A well-versed approach towards the pact could have reduced tensions in India, which has always looked at Iran as a friend. Iran was also attacked by Israel and the United States in 2025, and Tehran was well aware that there would be attacks against its resources, irrespective of the Indian leadership’s visit to Tehran’s adversaries. It is also ironic that Israel and Iran have to be termed as adversaries, as they were once best of friends, even involved together in a missile project called Project Flower. But that is the pitfall of foreign policy, subject to alteration not because of leadership but because of situational reasons.
PM Modi’s visit to Israel in 2026 was needed owing to the growing threat from Hamas, which has now percolated to Pakistan and is a concern for internal security. This visit was important as Iran, which had a strong influence over Hamas, witnessed reduced influence on the organisation, which was now seeking new alliances. India and Israel have long shared very cordial relations, and post Op Sindoor, there was no better way to pay gratitude to Israel for the weapons that India bought from Israel, which helped us to defend our territory not only against symmetric weapons of Pakistan, but also against asymmetric weapons like drones.
During wartime, states will resort to any mechanism of warfare. This mechanism will be the cheapest mechanism of warfare. Anti-access area denial (A2/AD) for dissuasion is usually the desired strategy for states and also non-state actors. This is precisely the reason why states, as well as non-state actors, could focus on anti-ship capabilities. In an A2/AD scenario, which includes choke points that are small passes but strategically critical, they become key targets during warfare. Under such modes of asymmetric warfare, becoming a key tactic for a regional power, foreign policy and economic decisions are challenging for a state which is not geographically situated in the region but bears repercussions.
Bipolar and unipolar worlds are non-existent in the present international order. This is precisely the reason why the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty collapsed as both the parties to the treaty, Russia and the United States, realised the looming threat from intermediate-range missiles developed by regional powers. The nonexistence of this bipolar world is also the reason why France has moved forward with quantitative as well as qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons.
Conclusion
In the absence of a unipolar and bipolar world order, various scenarios may arise where foreign policy becomes increasingly challenging to navigate. This dynamic situation is largely because other states are not practising a static approach to their foreign policy. Their visions and goals can shift over time, driven by evolving threat perceptions that stem from their security environments and the existing security architecture. These influences encompass both traditional and non-traditional security concerns, reflecting a wide array of interests and challenges.
Given these complexities, India will find its choices limited when it comes to formulating policies regarding state-to-state relations. The nation will need to carefully consider numerous factors to structure its foreign policies effectively. Foremost among these will be India’s own security environment, the intricacies of regional security dynamics, and prevailing global security concerns. Additionally, India must take into account the foreign policies and strategic priorities of other nations that pertain to its interests. As states navigate their own changing landscapes, India must remain adaptable, continually reassessing its strategies to respond effectively to the shifting tides of international relations and ensure national security in an ever-evolving global context. This will require a nuanced understanding of both regional and global interconnections. Consequently, India will need to carefully structure its foreign policies, taking into account its own security environment, regional dynamics, global security considerations, and the policies adopted by other states in relation to India.
Views are those of the Author(s)
